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Abstract 
The regulation of new technologies, as well as many other areas of our increasingly complex and 
interdependent societies, involves high uncertainty which grants broad epistemic discretion to the 
usually unelected regulators. This raises increasing concerns in the public law theory which 
traditionally requires all authoritative acts to be justified on the basis of certain principles mandated by 
the legislator (or in other words to be non-arbitrary). Political authorities respond to this challenge by 
the so-called science-based regulation however this approach in practice makes them defer to the 
advice of obscure and even less legitimate scientific bodies. Worse still, the courts are considered 
incompetent to review the scientific basis of such decisions and they fail in their duties in their own 
turn. 
In this paper I propose a way out of the latter problem, which was exemplified at least once in the 
well-known Pfizer case of the General Court of the EU. On my reading of the case, the Court reviewed 
the validity (but not the soundness) of the reasoning of the EU institutions in order to determine 
whether they had strayed away from the received expert advice arbitrarily. This rigorous review gives 
the authorities the flexibility necessary in cases of uncertainty yet it held them to a very strict standard 
of reasoning not to allow them to act arbitrary. Beyond the particular issue, the case shows that the 
traditional duty to give reasons, if taken seriously, can constrain epistemic discretion and on the other 
hand can allow the courts to review complex scientific issues without second guessing the political 
authorities. 
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TAKING REASONING SERIOUSLY: 
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN ENFORCING ARGUMENTATIVE 
RATIONALITY 
 
Vesco Paskalev 
 
The High Court of Justice of England and Wales asks the Court what is to be understood by the term 
‘monomer substance’. At  first  sight  the  reference  for  a  preliminary  ruling  appears  peculiar.  One 
might have expected the question to be addressed to a chemist. However, a closer examination shows that 
the question can and must be answered with the tools of Community law. 
Advocate General Kokott1 
Introduction 
David Hume noted that “A wise man proportions his beliefs to the evidence” and chooses what is 
supported by the greater number of experiences.2 Respectively a wise society would base its fiats on 
balance of the available competing expertise. Yet it is surprising how the need for balancing of 
evidence by the public authorities is neglected in legal theory. It is so preoccupied to make political 
process responsive to citizens (to their will or to their interest), that the need to make it responsive to 
arguments was ignored. This is easily explained with the legacy of the Enlightenment: we still live 
with the implicit assumption of scientific certainty, progress and emancipation even as it is becoming 
increasingly untenable today.3 On the account adopted in this article, the conclusions of scientific 
inquiry are matter of judgement on the balance of different competing pieces of evidence. However, 
having abandoned the vain hope for one undisputable Truth, we have to acknowledge also that 
balancing is not an ‘objective’ formula or a bright-line rule which will yield The Ultimate Answer. 
Thomas Kuhn4 has thought us, science cannot sustain any pretence for universal correctness and 
validity, and Bruno Latour5 and Sheila Jasanoff6 acknowledged that science is neither neutral nor 
independent of society, politics and culture. Instead, we have to cope with ‘reasonable pluralism’.7 
This applies not only to scientific discovery, but to any other forms of thinking, including balancing, 
rule-following and even computation. Yet this is not to say that we should abandon them; on the 
contrary – we should employ formal methods to add rigour to our reasoning and decision-making, to 
uncover our hidden assumptions and to make our conclusions sensitive to argumentative challenges. 
We only should accept that the state of persistent controversy (or in the area discussed here persistent 
uncertainty) is not exception or pathology, but the norm. The acknowledgment that decision-making 
(and even science-based regulation) is inevitably value-laden requires us to take into account those 
values: if we know it is futile to straighten our scales, we can instead deliberately tilt them according 
to the societal goals and values which are at stake.  
                                                     
1
 Opinion in Case C 558/07 S.P.C.M. SA, C.H. Erbslöh KG, Lake Chemicals and Minerals Ltd and Hercules Inc. v Secretary 
of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,  (ECJ) ECR I-05783. 
2
 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Peter Millican (ed), OUP 2008), p. 80. 
3
 For a concise summary of the ‘Enlightenment view’ and discussion of its obsolescence see Gerald F. Gaus, Contemporaty 
Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project (SAGE Publications 2003). 
4
 Thomas S Kuhn, ‘The structure of scientific revolutions’ (University of Chicago Press 1970). 
5
 Bruno Latour, ‘We have never been modern’ (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993).  
6
 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Designs on nature: science and democracy in Europe and the United States’ (Princeton University Press 
2005). 
7
 Gaus, Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project (n 3), p. 14. 
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The present paper will discuss the system of risk regulation in EU as one of reasonable pluralism: 
system which functions in a state of irredeemable uncertainty yet which is (or ought to be) sensitive to 
arguments. The system is heavily dependent on science, which is the common response to complexity 
and uncertainty.8 As science fails to yield the hard and fast evidence needed to resolve controversies, 
the stakeholders have to “fight science with science;”9 thus the decision-making authority is provided 
with abundant evidence favouring each of the sides which is not conclusive for either position. This 
leaves the decision-makers in the position to pick and choose. On the other hand, the common good, 
general will, the election results etc underdetermine the actual measures which are adopted by the 
various branches on a daily basis. This allows discretion on a scale which renders the principal-agent 
theory meaningless. Thus the irreducible complexity of governance seems to open space for arbitrary 
choices, where decision-maker can act as it pleases and justify its choice ex post.  
In the first part of the paper I suggest that this situation can be remedied if the well-known requirement 
for the administration to give reasons is taken seriously. Whatever its choice, it should be required to 
make explicit the whole chain of reasoning, from the most fundamental implicit assumptions to the 
furthest reaching conclusions. Thus the stakeholders and the critical public will evaluate whether the 
reasoning that lead to the decision is empirically sound and logically valid. My suggestion is that 
‘adding a method to their choices’ would make the decision-making critically dependent on the new 
information which is made available. On the other hand, it will constrain the decision-makers and 
prevent arbitrary or strategic decisions. However this will happen only under rigorous watch of the 
reasoning process. In the second part I discuss how the European Commission adopted a method to its 
reasoning and how the court enforced it in the Pfizer case.10 It is one primer how the General Court11 
(formerly the Court of First Instance) of the EU required the rigor necessary to assure non-arbitrary 
argument-sensitive decisions. Although the judges were no experts on the substance of the issue, they 
reviewed the substantive justification of the decision without second-guessing. Thus, it enforced what 
I shall call argumentative rationality. 
                                                     
8
 It is somewhat paradoxical that facing recognizable scientific uncertainty we choose to rely on science to resolve it. See 
Marjolein B. A. van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’ (2006) 9 Journal of 
Risk Research 313-336. My guess is that we turn to science because it is an argument-sensitive discipline. 
9
 Jane Holder, Maria Lee, and Sue Elworthy, Environmental protection, law and policy: text and materials (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2007). 
10
 Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v. Council. Hereinafter all references to paragraphs will be to this case, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
11
 Hereinafter “the Court” will stand for the General Court while the European Court of Justice will be always referred to 
with its abbreviation “ECJ.” 
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Why Reasons Matter? 
There is a deeply rooted tradition of Western political philosophy that political authority, in order to be 
legitimate, must be not only democratically responsive but also rational and reasonable. In one of its 
recent incarnations, Philip Pettit’s republicanism, authority to interfere in people’s lives must be non-
arbitrary12, and it is so to the extent that it is forced to track the relevant interests and ideas of citizens 
according to their own judgement.13 Legitimate authorities must be able “to give democratically 
persuasive reasons for their decisions.”14 A valid reason would be one that is believed to true by most 
members of the society, otherwise for the society it is not a reason at all. This is a demanding 
condition, because it places on the authorities the burden to take not only the right decisions but to 
take them for the right reasons (where both decisions and their premises are substantively contestable). 
The non-arbitrariness condition is applicable also to the ‘technical’ decisions; they also have to be 
supported by a chain of propositions which are empirically sound and logically valid. Citizens and 
stakeholders participate in the democratic process by either contesting such chains or by offering 
alternative decisions premised on chains of their own construction.  
Apart from conferring legitimacy the non-arbitrariness requirement can make the argumentation 
matter in the decision-making.15 Even a single individual would act for certain reasons; if acting 
reasonably means to act for reasons, then a reasonable individual would be able to state her reasons for 
taking certain action.16 Thus far, this is a minor constraint on her actions; having reasons need not 
(though it may) imply conformity to an external normative standard; even a whimsical choice has its 
reasons – if I eat strawberries with champagne my reason for doing so may be that I like them together 
and not necessarily because I want to impress someone with my cultured palate or my riches. Only in 
some cases reasons for actions are based on science or morals – I eat fruits because they are good for 
my health, or I do not eat strawberries in February because I do not like to damage the environment by 
having them shipped from the Southern hemisphere. In all cases however, reasonableness implies at 
least (1) availability of reasons (which the agent can articulate if asked), and (2) some degree of 
coherence among them.17 But I will strike you as unreasonable, if I state that I have eaten the first 
strawberry I was offered because “I like strawberries” yet I deny the second one because “I don’t like 
strawberries.” Yet, I can still reasonably deny the second strawberry because “I do not want to appear 
gluttonous” which does not contradict the reason already stated (“I like strawberries”). 
The same applies for public authorities: for example they cannot arbitrarily subsidise one strawberry 
farmer and not the other. Once a regulator has announced a policy to support strawberry producers it 
binds itself to apply it according to its stated terms. In administrative law this is well-known as the 
principles of legitimate expectations and of non-discrimination. What is less discussed is that 
authorities may find themselves constrained also by the reasons for the adoption of the policy. 
Suppose that the regulator has stated that it would support strawberry farmers because it is committed 
to promote public health. If later becomes known that strawberries are actually bad for health, the 
authority may find itself bound to reverse the policy. This would not be the case if the stated reason for 
the policy was not public health but rural development – the new evidence would have no bearings on 
                                                     
12
 Philip Pettit, ‘Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government’ (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1997) 
13
 Ibid, p. 55. 
14
 Philip Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52-65, p. 53 
15
 Elsewhere I shall demonstrate by formal models that there is more than semantic link between reason (as capacity) and 
reason (as premise for action). 
16
 Reasons for action are the beliefs on the premises one may consider relevant in deciding whether to take the action.  
17
 Coherence is not a normative requirement, yet a reason that is cancelled by another reason is no reason at all.  
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the policy at all. To generalise, the authoritative decisions are path-dependent, and the path is being set 
not only by the earlier decisions, but also by the reasons they were premised on.  
A telling example how such innocuous statements can matter was provided by a recent authorisation 
of a genetically modified potato for cultivation in Europe.18 There was vigorous controversy on all 
aspects of the issue, but eventually it boiled down to debate on two relevant premises – whether the 
potato may confer resistance to certain antibiotics to consumers through the food chain and whether 
these antibiotics are actually (or potentially) used in human medicine. According to the statement of 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) it was very unlikely that the cultivation of the potato may 
confer antibiotic resistance to humans and the antibiotics affected (kanamycin and neomycin) were not 
important for human and veterinary medicine anyway. Thus both premises were cumulatively satisfied 
and the potato was in train for authorisation. In the meantime however the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) published a report identifying these antibiotics as very important. Thus EFSA came under 
pressure to reverse its opinion. It actually did not; instead it tried to reshape the initial decisional 
framework stating that the premises should not be cumulatively but alternatively available. But this 
move took a big toll on its credibility, EFSA was severely criticised by the EU authorities and citizens. 
More importantly, on this ground the authorisation decision is now being challenged by five member 
states in the General Court. Should the Court rule for the applicants it will make a huge step toward 
making the Union non-arbitrary authority.  In any event, this example illustrates how the stated 
decisional method may constrain its author and how the new evidence may become factor for the 
decision, outside of decision-maker’s control. Note that the non-arbitrariness requirement has two 
sides: first, statements of reasons are commitments affecting future acts, and second, the use of reasons 
makes process sensitive to arguments.   
But if we want any of this to be more than a theoretical construction, we must seek institutions for 
epistemic vigilance – they are to make the decisions sensitive to arguments, i.e. they have to identify 
the commitments, to expose the ignoring of evidence and to punish violations. This is done by the 
adoption of rigorous reasoning methods and opening the process to argumentative challenges on the 
substance. Many of the established institutions and principles of public law can be interpreted as 
methods to enforce discipline of reason.19 Beyond the very duty to give reasons such function is 
performed by judicial review, ministerial oversight, transparency and accountability, public inquiries, 
impact assessments, cost-benefit analysis and generally, any criticism in the public sphere. Most of the 
institutions of contemporary democracy, intently or not, make the decision-making more sensitive to 
arguments and thus less arbitrary.  
My claim it that this argument holds for all public authorities including the administrative regulators 
even though they usually are agency which are (or at least perceived) as a singular decision-maker. 
Indeed, they always have very broad margin both to identify the set of premises relevant for the 
decision and to assess them with regard to the available evidence. However, once this is done in a 
policy paper, guidance or another ‘soft law’ instrument, the regulator is constrained by its own 
statement. It is under pressure to stick to its words. Certainly, this constraint is effective only when it 
is costly for the decision-maker to foreswear its earlier public statements of reasons.20 When it needs 
to interact with the surrounding environment this would often be the case; it is the vigilance of the 
others that makes the statements of reasons matter. This is especially the case with the EU institutions, 
                                                     
18
 For a detailed study of the case see Vesco Paskalev, ‘Can Science Tame Politics: The Collapse of the New GMO Regime 
in the EU’ (2012) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation. 
19
 Pettit’s classic model is that of premisewise voting, see Philip Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive 
Dilemma’ (2001) 35 Noûs 268-299. Elsewhere he has suggested also use of straw-poll and sequential voting but none of 
this is actually implemented anywhere. His practical proposals are various “contestatory” institutions allowing citizens to 
subject the authoritative decisions to public valuations see Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (n 14). 
20
 It may loose credibility, be publicly censured by the overseeing authority, its directors fired or loose bonuses or 
promotions; its decisions may be contested by stakeholders or even reversed by administrative or judicial review. 
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when no institution possesses full legal authority on any issue and even if it does it constantly seeks 
the cooperation of the others.  
Thus far I have argued that reasons ought and do matter in public decision-making. When this is so, 
rational actors would have a special interest to use reasons in order to influence the decisions. The use 
of arguments to influence the decision-making process I shall call argumentative rationality.21 
Argumentative rationality must be distinguished from instrumental rationality. The latter is a broader 
term and refers to the use of practical reason by actors in order to choose the action which is the best 
means to achieve their ends. Strictly speaking, argumentative rationality is a subspecies of 
instrumental rationality, where the means are arguments and the end is persuading the other actors in 
order to secure certain preferred collective decision. Argumentative rationality is not always an 
effective means to this end but in two cases it is: either when other agents are open to be persuaded, or 
in cases where the decision-making process is deliberately designed to be sensitive to arguments. The 
former corresponds to what deliberative democrats call ideal speech situation and the present paper is 
not concerned with it. It will be concerned only with the latter case where the decision-making itself is 
geared in such a way that the arguments brought forward make difference, despite the stubbornness or 
selfishness of the agents. My claim is that public exchange of arguments, i.e. discourse in the public 
sphere, may be an independent factor for the behaviour of the rational agents. A vigorous debate is 
going on in the current scholarship whether arguing or bargaining prevails in international negotiations 
and especially in the EU, but I do not need to take side in this paper.22 Instead I shall take the modest 
position that arguments matter at least ceteribus paribus, and will be interested how they can be made 
to matter more. This is the perspective of ‘discursive institutionalism’ whose leading proponent 
cautiously warns that discourse does not preclude power and we should not assume that deliberation 
can trump manipulation.23   
On this approach the agents are considered to be not only rational, but reflectively rational – while 
they pursue their self-serving goals in accordance to their beliefs, they also “think about their thoughts, 
reflect upon their actions, state their intentions, alter their actions as a result of their thoughts about 
their actions … and change their minds in response to persuasion by others regarding what they are 
thinking, saying and doing.”24 While this approach may be applied to all areas of decision-making, it is 
particularly appropriate for regulation or risk, because the decisions in that area are by definition taken 
in a state of uncertainty and most susceptible to change upon new information. The pertinence of the 
concept of reflectively rational agents (or reflective agents for short) was illustrated during the 
volcanic ash crisis in April 2010, when all flights in northern Europe were cancelled for about a week, 
leaving millions of passengers stranded abroad. All of the agents involved had their self-serving goals, 
yet their beliefs and preferences were not fixed; they developed as new information was made 
available. Thus, even though the air companies appeared to prefer to fly and avoid losses, it would be 
inaccurate to say that their interest or preference was to fly and to risk passengers’ lives because any 
accident would bring enormous losses to them as well. Nor could the interest of the passengers be 
                                                     
21
 The paradigmatic example here is the jury trial where the parties use argument to secure the outcome that suits them best. 
It may appear that the second case depends on the availability of at least minimal number of persuadable participants but 
this is not necessarily so.  
22
 For this debate see for example Thomas Risse, ‘‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 1-39, Cornelia Ulbert, Thomas Risse, and Harald Müller, ‘Arguing and Bargaining in 
Multilateral Negotiations,’ Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy (ATASP) (2004). For the 
futility of the debate see Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, ‘Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with 
Habermas’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 167-179. 
23
 Vivien A Schmidt, ‘Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the 
fourth ‘new institutionalism’’ (2010) 2 European Political Science Review 1-25, p. 21. 
24
 Ibid, p. 17. This is a significant departure from the classic instrumental rationality, which takes agents’ goals for granted, 
and as unchangeable during the interactions. Schmidt uses the term sentient agents, but I find it a bit esoteric and prefer 
reflectively rational or just reflective. 
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taken for granted – certainly their paramount concern was to remain alive, yet they also were desperate 
to fly home. Finally, the regulators were responsible mainly to avoid risks, yet they also did not prefer 
to keep the sky closed for weeks just to be on the safe side. All agents reflectively changed their 
preferences during the interactions in response to the new evidence.25  
Argumentative rationality must be distinguished from what political scientists call rhetorical action, or 
“strategic use of norm-based arguments.”26 The latter is another sub-species of instrumental rationality 
which is used in “institutional environments [where] political actors are concerned about their 
reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their preferences and behaviour.”27 In such cases 
agents are required to justify their claims on the ground of certain common values, i.e. they may 
advance certain interest only if it is represented as a common one while on the other hand they are can 
defeat opponents by showing that they fail to do so.  While the claims used in rhetorical actions may 
be permitted or not with regard to certain common values, argumentative rationality allows them to be 
judged in terms of logical validity or invalidity, persuasiveness and coherence.  
Another subtle distinction that needs to be done is between argumentative rationality as defined here, 
and argumentative rationality in the sense in which it is used by Thomas Risse.28 He uses it as 
equivalent to Habermas’s communicative action; argumentatively rational agents in that account have 
the specific goal to reach common understanding; they are open to persuasion and power recedes in 
the background.29 The sense in which I use argumentative rationality is much less laden and neither of 
the two is necessary. Nevertheless, on both Risse’s and mine version, the agents are reflective, i.e. they 
take into account new information which may affect their beliefs and goals. Here the goal of the agents 
is only to persuade others in the general social choice case, and in the particular case of participation 
in regulatory processes - to provide the public authorities with convincing reasons for action.  The 
agent may succeed if he provides reasons that appear to pertain to the public interest and the truth, and 
in that sense it is a reason that could be accepted as valid by all. However, this may be only the means 
to achieve selfish ends, and not goal itself as it is for Habermas and his followers. I believe this is 
important relaxation of the ideal speech situation and in my view even if agents are not honest truth-
seekers arguments can matter. 
An example may expose the subtle differences between rhetorical action, argumentative rationality (in 
my sense) and communicative action. Think of an Italian politician who proposes a restriction on pasta 
import on the ground that pasta is not merely food, but an expression of the Italian culture, which is 
endangered by cheaper imitations coming from other members of the EU. If his real concern is to 
protect domestic industry from competitors we have a classic example of rhetorical action. As overt 
protection of domestic industry violates the free movement norms, such proposal cannot be 
legitimately defended, therefore the politician substitutes it with permissible proxies. An example of 
argumentative action in the sense adopted here would be the case when the same politician provides 
some statistical information that the pasta production in Italy is decreasing to the point of 
disappearance and that is why an intervention to save it is necessary. It would not matter if the agent 
actually cares for local culture or for vested business interests, or whether he is ready to be persuaded 
if contrary evidence is present. What distinguishes argumentation from rhetoric is that the reasons 
given are subject to verification and refutation. Finally, we would have an example of communicative 
action in the Habermasean sense if this politician is himself willing to give up his concerns for 
domestic producers if faced with counter-evidence that neither pasta, nor its producers are endangered. 
                                                     
25
 Note that in such circumstances the principal-agent account cannot make any sense at all. 
26
 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union’ (2001) 55 International Organization 47-80, p. 47. 
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Risse, ‘‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics’ (n 22). 
29
 Ibid, p. 7. 
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When the latter is the case we are in ideal speech situation and it is likely that agents would reach 
consensus. In my view genuine truth-seeking, persuasion and agreements do happen30 yet they are 
hardly the norm, hence the common criticism that deliberative democratic accounts are utopian. That 
is why I propose a thinner version of argumentative rationality as seeking to provide reasons for action 
and not to reach consensus.  
Thus far I have argued that reasons ought and sometimes do matter in public decision-making. When 
this is so, rational actors would have a special interest to use reasons in order to influence the 
decisions. For the purposes of this paper I shall call the use of arguments to influence the decision-
making process argumentative rationality.31 Argumentative rationality is a subspecies of instrumental 
rationality, where the means are arguments and the end is persuading the other actors in order to 
secure certain preferred collective decision.  
                                                     
30
 See for example the seminal article Christian Joerges and Jurgen Neyer, ‘Transforming strategic interaction into 
deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector’ (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 
609-625, more recently Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Strategic Bargaining, Norms and Deliberation’ in Daniel Naurin and Helen 
Wallace (eds.) Unveiling the Council of the European Union : games governments play in Brussels, Palgrave Macmillan 
(2008) and also Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’ 
(2005) 59 International Organization 801-826 and the following articles in the same volume. 
31
 The paradigmatic example here is the jury trial where the parties use argument to secure the outcome that suits them best. 
It may appear that the second case depends on the availability of at least minimal number of persuadable participants but 
this is not necessarily so.  
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Enforcing Discipline of Reason 
In the previous section I have postulated the non-arbitrariness as condition for legitimacy of the acts of 
public authority (which is amply justified by Philip Pettit). I argued that this condition makes reasons 
matter, and in turn, that the reliance on reasons constrains the authority and makes it sensitive to 
arguments. For this to happen in real life however, I suggested that first authorities must have stated 
methods for reasoning, and second, the others must be vigilant whether they apply them. Now I show 
how soft law is such method and how the court can enforce it. In the well-known Pfizer case the Court 
reviewed the reasoning of the EU institutions with regard to the method announced in a 
Communication of the European Commission. In particular, it assessed whether certain array of 
available evidence could justify certain the conclusion of the Council. Thus, it reviewed the quality of 
epistemic base of the decision and the validity of the conclusions drawn from it.  
Precautionary Principle as Empowering Principle 
The precautionary principle as understood by the European Commission provides an instructive 
example for a rigorous method for discipline of reason. Originating in environmental law now it is 
understood to be a general principle of Union law.32 On its face, this is a broad principle which 
empowers the decision-makers to take measures for protection even if the actuality of the danger is 
uncertain.33 Such seemingly was its initial understanding by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
which used to be deferential to the Union institutions. In the previous landmark case – FEDESA – ECJ 
reviewed only “whether the measure in question is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers, or 
whether the authority in question has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion”34 and it applied 
this test with a ‘light touch.’35  
From the fact that the countries were unable to agree on the assessment of evidence the Court assumed 
that evidence was inconclusive and this had unleashed the Council to do as it pleased. Thus, in the 
parlance adopted here, the ECJ did not impose any reasoning methodology to the authorities. Many 
commentators commended this approach; interestingly for Fisher claimed that instead of being 
controlled by the political principal, the decision-maker should be “insulated from the mainstream 
political process, which is over-responsive to particular political interests.”36 Thus, in lieu of trust in 
objectivity, the trust in such deliberative decision-making process should be derived “from human 
capacity for civic virtue and public reason.”37 This claim, in principle, agrees with the argument 
developed in the previous section. Fisher’s argument from practical reasoning finds normative support 
in the republican theory. The call for deliberation and insulation of the decision-maker apparently 
corresponds to Pettit’s call for depoliticization38 and to his argument that decisions should embody 
collective reason rather than public opinion.39 Fisher’s argument is not based on the republican theory 
and does not discuss how public reason is to be achieved. On the contrary, she explicitly contrasts the 
suggested ‘deliberative’ approach to the application of stricter methodology which she associates only 
                                                     
32
 In Pfizer see para 114 and 183 and the list of cases referred to in para 115. 
33
 See Principle 15, UN Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), 
<www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163>, accessed on 12 February 
2011.  
34
 C 331/88 FEDESA and Others v. Council,  (ECJ), para 8. 
35
 Paul P Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, ‘EU law: text, cases, and materials’ (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 570. 
36
 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Risk regulation and administrative constitutionalism’ (Hart 2007), p. 31.   
37
 Ibid, p. 35.  
38
 Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (n 14). 
39
 See especially Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma’ (n 19). 
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with the principal-agent paradigm.40 This is unfortunate, because if the argument elaborated above is 
correct non-arbitrary decisions can be attained only through use of some method imposing discipline 
of reason.  
Precautionary Principle as Bright-line Rule 
Feeling the need to deal with the precautionary discretion the Commission published a 
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle.41 The Communication is not a 
binding instrument, nevertheless it represents a commitment by the Commission to abide to it itself.42  
According to the Communication risk regulation consists of three elements – risk assessment, risk 
management, and communication of risk.43 Risk assessment is considered to be a matter of scientific 
expertise, while risk management is a matter of political choice.  
In the parlance adopted here this would allegedly provide a method for discipline of reason and should 
be welcomed. However the method appears to be too rigid and its core is the mechanical division of 
risk assessment and risk management. The Communication is very clear that precautionary principle 
guides risk management only.44 One reason to circumscribe it in this way was the pursuit of scientific 
legitimacy by reliance on an objective and independent source of knowledge. Note that scientific 
objectivity is understood as firm exclusion of social and political factors which are supposed to be 
taken into account by the political authority in the distinctively different phase of risk management. 
Ideally, this division into discrete tasks should still allow the administration free choice to act or not to 
act in the face of risks, yet it should not allow the adoption of arbitrary decisions as the discretion 
phase is reached only after certain triggering conditions are satisfied according to the ‘independent 
science’.  
Thus, only after satisfying itself that there is “a scientific evaluation of the risk which because of the 
insufficiency of the data, their inconclusive or imprecise nature, makes it impossible to determine with 
sufficient certainty the risk in question” the public authority is unleashed to choose whether to take 
precautious action.45 The action itself should be subject to cost-benefit analysis as well as the other 
applicable principles of EU law as proportionality, non-discrimination, etc.46 Public health should have 
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greater weight than economic considerations (but only in this stage).47 If the conditions of what we 
may call precautionary discretion are met, the precautionary action is expected to be judicially 
reviewed only for manifest error, misuse of power or exceeding the scope of discretion, which used to 
be a low-intensity test until 2002 when Pfizer was decided. 
The risk analysis framework established by the Communication ignored what Weimer calls the “social 
embedment of scientific reasoning” and its usual uncertainty in the areas of risk. Apparently the 
Commission called the Enlightenment view to provide scientific legitimacy to its regulatory power. 
There are three palpable problems with such objectivist view. First, the application of norms reliant on 
conclusive assessments is thwarted when science fails to deliver them. Science often cannot provide 
any probability of the risk assessed yet some probability estimate is needed to trigger the more flexible 
risk management. Nor is science always able to estimate the degree of its uncertainty about the results. 
Second, if the risk assessment and risk management phases remain truly discrete, the allegedly 
political risk management decisions will be often pre-determined by obscure expert risk assessors. The 
seemingly functional division of labour actually brings about an enormous shift of decision-making 
power. Thus, the employment of independent expertise fails to confer scientific legitimacy to 
regulatory decisions yet it deprives political actors from choice. Finally, while the objectivist view 
explicitly excludes legitimate considerations from the assessment, many implicit value-laden 
assumptions still pervade them.48  Certainly “if  science  is  perceived  as objective  and  neutral,  then  
all  the “extra-scientific”  considerations  will necessarily appear as secondary, because they are 
interest guided or arbitrary or  simply  not  “fact.”49 If some premises are granted the status of “hard 
and fast” then it is inevitable that the others will be “softened” and easier to ignore.50 The last problem 
seemingly was noticed by the European Council which agreed with the Communication but called for 
greater role of deliberation and values.51 As it will be seen below, the Court got the message. 
There is one further reason why risk assessment cannot be left to science only: the principle of 
scientific parsimony. It is generally considered that in case of doubt a diligent scientist should apply 
Occam’s Razor52 i.e. she should presume non-existence of certain causal effect or untoward 
consequences. She would certainly state the limitations of current knowledge, yet if she is to draw a 
conclusion it is likely to contain only what is certain or at least probable and the variety of effects that 
are merely possible (as well as the disclaimers) are likely to be left out.53 Thus science and regulation 
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are guided by different decisional principles and the principle of the one may lead to inadequate 
conclusions if applied to the other.54  When the two are rigidly separated and compartmentalised to the 
respective epistemic community there will often be negative collisions: scientific parsimony will often 
prevent political precaution from coming into play at all.   
 The problems would be avoided is two distinct conclusions from the same evidence can be drawn; if it 
is insufficient we may have to suspend our epistemic judgement, nevertheless we still can make a 
practical judgement if we must decide on a policy.55 Apparently the job of the scientists is to make 
only epistemic judgements and of the regulators to make practical ones. Both judgements are to be 
premised on the same evidential basis, while the reasoning methodology may be different. The trouble 
with the Communication’s approach is that the compartmentalisation of the two judgements into risk 
assessment and risk management makes the practical judgement premised on the epistemic one. On 
the view advocated here, the risk managers are to engage with the factual premises themselves, i.e. to 
balance the evidence and this seemingly is what the Court in Pfizer allowed them to do. 
In the preceding section I have argued that non-arbitrariness requires public authorities to be 
constrained by the arguments and evidence and this may appear to contradict to the argument here that 
they should have the liberty to assess the evidence differently. Yet the contradiction is only prima 
facie. Precisely because decision-makers can be constrained by the evidence placed in the public 
domain they are to remain responsible to draw the practical conclusions from it. But if scientific 
evidence is central for regulation of certain issue then it should be subjected to the usual mechanisms 
of accountability and criticism in the public sphere and not black-boxed into obscure expert bodies.  In 
turn courts must review the evidence the public authorities relied upon.  
The Precautionary Principle as Balancing Formula 
The issue in Pfizer was a Council decision to prohibit the use of virginamicin, an antibiotic used as 
growth promoter in pig and poultry farming throughout Europe for the past 30 years. Yet a concern 
was growing that excessive antibiotic use promotes development of antibiotic resistance which might 
be transferred from animals to humans. Virginamicin is not used in human medicine, but it belongs to 
the group of streptogramins, and there are several other antibiotics in this group, which are or may be 
used; it is their efficacy that would be endangered if virginamicin-resistance is transferred to humans. 
However, there was no conclusive evidence that the continuous use of virginamicin as growth 
promoter in farming presents actual risk of transfer of such resistance and respectively that there is 
any risk for human health. Pfizer which had been dully authorised to produce virginamicin, claimed 
that the available evidence did not justify its prohibition, and that the precautionary principle does not 
warrant adoption of a zero-risk policy. The EU institutions claimed that there is enough evidence that 
potential risk exists, even though they agreed that there is no evidence for actual danger for the time 
being and also that precautionary principle does not justify zero-risk policy. 
The process which lead to the ban was initiated by Denmark, which decided to prohibit virginamicin 
use in farming on its territory. It invoked a safeguard clause in the applicable directive, which allowed 
it to take such action if there is ‘new information’ or ‘reassessment of existing information’ that an 
EU-authorised product constitutes danger to animal or human health.56 The Commission referred the 
information supporting the Danish ban to the Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition (SCAN), a 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the risk managers as a conclusion that probability of the risk is low (Fisher, ‘Risk regulation and administrative 
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permanent advisory body. Pfizer also submitted its observations to SCAN and had discussions with 
the Commission officials. On 10 July 1998 SCAN issued its opinion where it considered the 
information provided and concluded that “there was no new evidence … to substantiate the transfer of 
[antibiotic] resistance [to] compromise the future use of therapeutics in human medicine” and also that 
“the data provided do not justify the immediate action taken by Denmark to preserve streptogramins as 
therapeutic agents of last resort in humans.”57 Nevertheless, the Commission proposed to ban the use 
of virginamicin and three other antibiotics as growth promoters.58 The draft was considered by a 
comitology committee (Standing Committee for Feedingstuffs) which failed to reach a decision. Thus, 
the regulation was referred to the Council which adopted it (17 December 1998). Pfizer filed an 
application for its annulment. 
The central controversy was on the fact that the EU institutions had disregarded the opinion of the 
scientific advisory body - SCAN - and relying on the precautionary principle adopted the ban on the 
ground of what was acknowledged to be inconclusive scientific evidence. There was some evidence 
for potential risk and abundant evidence from the long harmless practice, so that the institutions had to 
balance between arguments for and against the ban, while the Court reviewed if that balancing was 
done correctly with surprising rigour.  In effect it “peer-reviewed” the assessments of the institutions 
in order to decide whether they had proper evidential basis to draw a conclusion that they can take 
precautionary action. 
What provoked this new rigour were, in my view, the special circumstances of the case: there was 
well-established practice to use antibiotics as growth promoters and no case of actual harm to animal 
or human health.  Thus, the unrestrained discretion of institutions to act as they choose which was 
allowed by Even though the precautionary principle on its generous interpretation as per FEDESA 
would sustain a ban, public authorities should not destroy so well-established economic activity and 
abolish the predominant farming practices59 without sufficiently substantiated argumentation. It would 
be unpredictable, populist, capricious, superstitious and most importantly it would violate the non-
arbitrariness principle.  
Apparently the other thing that brought about change in the jurisprudence was that the Commission 
itself had moved to constrain itself with the Communication. Even though the ban was adopted (and 
the appeal was lodged) before the Communication was issued, the case was decided after it, and the 
Court relied on it in its reasoning. It explicitly noted that the Communication “may be taken as a 
codification of the law as it stood at the time.”60 In the phrase adopted here, with the Communication 
the Commission adopted a method for collective reasoning, and subsequently the Court controlled 
whether its decisions were up to its own method.  
The first striking thing in this judgement is its sheer length – it is 519 paragraphs long, well above the 
50 paragraphs of FEDESA.61 The second and more important thing is that the Court reviewed the 
scientific information that was presented by the parties in the run up to the ban in terms of availability 
and comprehensiveness of evidence and of validity of the inferences drawn from it. The Court did not 
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shy away from this task, but plunged in what seems to be quality control of scientific reasoning.62 As 
the dispute was on what the proper assessment of the risk was, the Court explicitly announced that it 
will examine whether “the Council was wrong on conclusion of a risk assessment that was not 
properly conducted”63 before evaluation of its management of that risk. The third important thing in 
this judgement is the elevated role that the Court awarded to the scientific advisory bodies. It is 
impressive that the Court dismissed Council’s defence that SCAN was Commission’s advisor and the 
Council was in no way bound by its opinion.64 The Court held that EU institutions must seek advice 
from independent advisors, which is not new,65 but also that they will be held responsible to justify 
their deviations from that advice. Finally, it is not immediately obvious, but the Court abandoned the 
clear distinction between facts and value that the Communication was at pains to establish, and 
allowed the assessment of the facts to be tinted by the values at stake.  
This was the first deviation from the Communication. In Court’s understanding of the method, values 
could be taken into account in risk assessment. However, it provided guarantees against arbitrariness – 
institutions were required to collect all evidence and to take advice from independent experts. Yet this 
expertise should not prejudice the practical judgement of the political authorities. In order to preserve 
responsibility to whom it belongs the Court allowed them to diverge from the recommendations on the 
condition that they can justify it on "sufficiently reliable and cogent"66 alternative information. To 
maintain the latter guarantee meaningful the Court itself would engage in rigorous review of the 
available epistemic base and the conclusions drawn from it.  
By allowing values at stake to affect the assessment of evidence the Court turned Communication’s 
bright-line rule into open-ended balancing.67 Even though it formally maintained the distinction 
between risk assessment and risk management, it emphasised that the non-scientific factors at stake 
should be taken into account when the level of unacceptable risk is being determined: 
the authority may take account, inter alia, of the severity of the impact on human health were the 
risk to occur, including the extent of possible adverse effects, the persistency or reversibility of 
those effects and the possibility of delayed effects as well as of the more or less concrete 
perception of the risk based on available scientific knowledge.68 
The Court was aware that in cases of risk regulation evidence will be often inconclusive, that is why it 
held that, having collected the best available expertise,   
the competent public authority must therefore weigh up its obligations and decide either to wait 
until the results of more detailed scientific research become available or to act on the basis of the 
scientific information available. Where measures for the protection of human health are concerned, 
the outcome of that balancing exercise will depend, account being taken of the particular 
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circumstances of each individual case, on the level of risk which the authority deems unacceptable 
for society.69  
In turn when reviewing the weighing by the institutions the Court should take account “first of the 
seriousness of the repercussions … and second, of the results of the scientific research.” Figuratively 
speaking they have to balance the evidence with scales tilted according to values at stake.  
Yet by reinterpreting the precautionary principle as open-ended formula the Court did not issue a 
blank check to the EU institutions to make arbitrary risk assessments. On the contrary, it placed on 
them heavy burden to justify their decision with scientific reasoning of highest quality.70 The Court 
went a long way to make authorities engage with assessment of the evidence and thus to remain fully 
responsible for the decision. It was well aware of the danger of allowing the “other” factors to 
undermine the scientific legitimacy and that is why it emphasised that when the institutions are 
granted broad discretion to affect legally protected positions71 “the guarantees conferred by the 
Community legal order in administrative proceedings are of even more fundamental importance.”72 
With its lengthy judgement the Court was struggling to re-establish these guarantees and enforce a 
method to institutions’ reason. 
The first guarantee was that the “competent public authority must … entrust a scientific risk 
assessment to experts who …will provide it with scientific advice”73 and they must obtain scientific 
advice even if the secondary legislation has not specifically provided so. The rationale of this 
requirement is apparently the information provided by the advisors, once in the public domain, would 
make a difference. The Court went on to hold that the institutions “must ensure that their decisions are 
taken in the light of the best scientific information available and that they are based on the most recent 
results of international research”74 and also that “the institutions were in a position to examine 
carefully and impartially all relevant evidence in a particular case.”75 The Court sought to perfect not 
only the decision-making process but the epistemic base of the decision and to enforce methodology 
for rigorous reasoning. 
It is worth to consider the role of scientific advisors which is accorded by this test. Even though SCAN 
was advisory body of the Commission, the Court found that “the Council was wrong to maintain … 
that the assessment made in the SCAN opinion could not have any influence on its own position 
[because it] did not ask for an alternative risk assessment to that carried out by SCAN but that it 
endorsed the position adopted by the Commission … and did so on the basis, inter alia, of the SCAN 
opinion [therefore] the risk assessment carried out in this case by the Commission on the basis, inter 
alia, of the SCAN opinion also binds the Council.”76 Thus the fact that Council’s decision was 
justified in part by the information from the advisor’s opinion was taken to mean that Council is 
constrained by that opinion. In other words, the Court held the Council to abide to the reasons made 
available in the public domain.  The Council would not be able to justify different conclusions if it did 
not rely also on other scientific information (which in this case it did): 
To the extent to which the Community institution opts to disregard the opinion, it must provide 
specific reasons for its findings by comparison with those made in the opinion and its statement of 
                                                     
69
 Para 161. 
70
 Para 154. 
71
 Para 170. 
72
 Para 171. 
73
 Para 157, emphasis added. This claim was following from well established case law . 
74
 Para 159. 
75
 Para 268, emphasis added. 
76
 Para 195.  
Taking Reasoning Seriously 
15 
reasons must explain why it is disregarding the latter. The statement of reasons must be of a 
scientific level at least commensurate with that of the opinion in question.”77  
Yet in the same time the Court was at pains not to make Council’s decision pre-determined by 
SCAN’s opinion, because “the members of SCAN, although they have scientific legitimacy, have 
neither democratic legitimacy nor political responsibilities. Scientific legitimacy is not a sufficient 
basis for the exercise of public authority.”78 What the Court was struggling to promote was to make 
the public authorities, laypersons as they are, make choices informed by the best scientific evidence 
yet not pre-determined by this evidence: 
risk management … can be properly performed by a public authority only if it acquires from the 
various bodies and departments working on its behalf … sufficient technical knowledge to grasp 
the full significance of the scientific analysis performed by the independent experts and to decide, 
in full knowledge of the facts, whether a preventive measure should be taken and, if so, which.”   
Taking into account the different principles which should guide epistemic and practical judgements 
discussed above, this should come as no surprise. The legitimate way to respond to uncertainty is to 
allow public authorities to draw different conclusions from the same evidence. This rationale explains 
the almost baroque holding that the Council may “rely on certain aspects of the scientific analysis.”79 
By allowing the political authorities to rely only partly on scientific opinions, the Court intended to 
encourage them80 not to treat “The Science” as a black-box but to engage with the scientific arguments 
and if need be, to balance them differently with regard to the values they are called to protect. On 
other accounts this partial reliance would appear as allowing the authorities to cherry-pick the 
scientific advice. The only way for the Court to ensure that the new freedom to take different view on 
the same evidence will not violate the principle of non-arbitrariness was to engage itself in rigorous 
judicial review.  
As for the review itself, the Court did not discuss much the intensity of review, nor its own role in 
imposing discipline of reason; it only reiterated the mantra that it is a case of discretion and it will 
review the decision only for manifest error, misuse of powers or excess. However the judgement itself 
was a striking departure from the lenient earlier jurisprudence of both the General Court and the ECJ. 
The review consisted of two parts. In the first the Court scrutinised whether Council had distorted 
SCAN’s findings, i.e. whether the same evidence could be assessed differently.  In the second part, the 
Court reviewed whether from these factual assessment the Council could logically draw the 
conclusions it did (i.e. if he had made any ‘errors in conclusion’).   
Thus, the Court satisfied itself that the institutions reasoning was sufficiently substantiated by with the 
available information, they did not distort the SCAN findings but only weighed the evidence 
differently, did not made manifest error in drawing conclusions on the basis of it,  and narrowly 
upheld the contested regulation. 
The rigorous scrutiny of the justification of the decision taken by the political authority in Pfizer may 
appear similar to that of the infamous Lochner case of the US Supreme Court.81 Lochner is criticised 
as allowing the courts to second-guess the legislature on the substance of the adopted rules. There the 
Supreme Court reviewed a statute limiting the working hours of bakers on the ground of health 
concerns. The Supreme Court substantively re-evaluated the arguments for protection of public health 
and decided that the measure was “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference” in 
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contractual freedom. Even though the Pfizer court seems to do that as well, in my view it is quite 
different. What the Court was doing was rigorous evaluation of the quality of evidence, and also 
review of validity of conclusions. As the evidence was inconclusive, i.e. allowed more than one 
logical conclusion, the Court allowed the public authorities to make the ultimate choice. The judicial 
approach in Pfizer should rather be called legislative due care review and the more appropriate 
analogy is with the Waterpenny case of the German Constitutional Court.82 There the court reviewed 
the constitutionality of legislative act which was justified with economic arguments. It required from 
the legislature, “when introducing social science evidence into their considerations … to take due care 
in not glossing over the evidence and being circumspect in gathering enough of it. … to engage in an 
extensive procedure of fact finding and hearings prior to legislating, just in order to make sure that the 
act under controversy will survive before the constitutional court.”83 Similarly, Pfizer established a 
tight standard for due legislative care. It may be debatable whether the Pfizer Court was too lenient or 
too rigorous, yet it did open space for value judgements and political sensitivities which the Lochner 
court did not, and that is why it ruled for the administration in the end of the day. 
It is debated whether this new test was stringent or lenient. On one side, Corkin claims that Pfizer put 
the “evidential bar so low that the community institutions should, in most cases, be able to make their 
regulations review-proof in spite of any “inconvenient” scientific advice.”84  Others think the test was 
too stringent and placed unbearable evidential burden on the institutions (Chalmers) and impeded their 
ability to react to the unexpected (Fisher). According to Chalmers the Court allowed to the authorities 
to stray from SCAN’s opinion only because two conditions were fulfilled: “the Council relied upon 
other scientific evidence of equivalent probative value and gave reasons for why it departed from 
SCAN’s opinion.”85 
If we distinguish the scope of discretion from the reasoning rigour that may be required in exercising it 
both sides are correct.86 Institutions may have wide array of options for possible action yet be 
subjected to a stringent requirement to derive their choice from persuasive evidence. Even though 
Pfizer was apparently departure from earlier cases like FEDESA or Angelopharm87 Corkin correctly 
notes that it “fit[s] comfortably into the same process-perfecting tradition.”88 If Fisher was right to say 
that the Court limited the scope of discretion in applying the precautionary principle the ban would be 
overturned. On what she calls rationalist-instrumentalist approach the EU institutions would not be 
allowed to deviate from SCAN’s opinion. Chalmers is more to the point, because in his view the 
discretion was not limited, but only its exercise was made more difficult by the additional burden for 
justification. Indeed, even though the Court upheld the ban, the review was rigorous and if the 
judgement is juxtaposed to FEDESA it becomes obvious that this was not a limited review as Corkin 
believes. Yet is correct to note that Pfizer opened space for political judgement (in the face of the 
Communication). Yet again, with regard to the aftermath of the case, Chalmers and Fisher are rightly 
concerned that the Court placed so heavy justificatory burden to the institutions who wish to deviate 
from advisors, that they effectively never did it again. 
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Alberto Alemanno suggested that peer-review should be practiced in risk assessments, where “it 
involves an in-depth assessment of the assumptions, calculations, alternative interpretations, 
methodology and conclusions. In particular, by taking the form of a deliberation, it involves an 
exchange of judgements about the appropriateness of methods and the strength of the author’s 
inferences.”89  In my opinion the Pfizer court was very close to doing that. Its review, just like the peer 
reviews aimed to ascertain transparency and consistency of reasoning and inclusion of all relevant 
argumentation. To generalise beyond the particular case, both the peer editing an academic article and 
the reviewing court have to engage substantively with the argumentation, while abstaining from 
second guessing the assessments and the conclusions under review. Currently Pfizer is the leading 
authority on the precautionary principle in the EU. However, for the ten years since it was decided its 
rigour remains unmatched90  so my claim for the potential of courts to exercise epistemic vigilance 
may be overblown. In the recent Gowan case,91 the Commission had deviated from the received expert 
advice to restrict the use of certain substance for plant protection. On its surface the ECJ followed the 
earlier reasoning of the General Court in Pfizer and confirmed that the Commission could not adopt 
unjustified restrictions without scientific justification,92 and claimed to have verified whether the facts 
it relied on were accurately stated and supported the conclusions reached. But it did so perfunctorily 
and failed to control the steps of the reasoning process which lead to the decision as was done in 
Pfizer; remarkably it failed to review whether the Commission could modify its own position without 
stating reasons or having new justification. In view of one commentator it reduced the reason giving 
requirement to a duty of production and not a duty of persuasion; it surrendered its role as gatekeeper 
of precautionary action thus undermining the legitimacy of the decision-making process in cases of 
uncertainty.93 On the account suggested here, a more rigorous review leading to occasional strokes of 
arbitrary actions of the EU institutions would strengthen their legitimacy. Unfortunately, this time is 
yet to come. 
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Conclusion 
The Commission of the European Union felt the need to increase its legitimacy by imposing some 
method for discipline of reason when applying the precautionary principle. For that purpose it adopted 
a Communication which turned what was thus far broad and empowering principle into a clear-cut 
formula or bright-line rule, which would function ideally with quantifiable scientific conclusions 
untainted with political considerations. It is arguable whether the nature of the regulated matter, 
marred by uncertainty even when the best available science is employed, could be subject to such 
framework at all. Without explicitly departing from this interpretation, in Pfizer the Court allowed for 
more flexible balancing of evidence with regard to the values at stake and made best efforts to put the 
EU institutions back in charge of doing that. It had clear intent both to keep political authorities 
responsible for the choices, and in the same time make their decisions informed by the scientific 
expertise. This was delicate task, as the line between mandating the institutions to defer to experts on 
life and death issues, and allowing them free sway to disregard science is thin. On the question 
whether and how much the authorities are constrained by the opinion of their expert advisors hangs the 
balance between scientific and political legitimacy of the Union regulation. Holding that SCAN’s 
opinion is not binding would risk arbitrariness of decisions and stripping the independent risk 
assessment of any meaning. Holding that it is binding would shift all decision-making power to 
obscure expert bodies. By allowing the Union institutions to rely on the provided scientific advice but 
to draw different conclusions, the Court struck a middle ground. In the parlance adopted here, it 
enforced a modified version of Commission’s own formula for discipline of reason and argument-
sensitive decision-making. 
The way the Court seemingly squared the circle was by rigorous review of the quality of information 
and of the validity of conclusions, and deferring to the outcome of the balancing. This was its attempt 
to ensure that in conditions of uncertainty the choice will be open to the Union institutions but that 
they will remain responsive to scientific argumentation albeit the balance will be conditioned by the 
values at stake.  
Yet the rigour of Court’s approach may have backfired. The burden to justify deviation from expert 
advice encouraged the Union institutions to defer to the received expertise rather than critically engage 
with it. Pfizer judgement was followed by proliferation of expert advisory agencies in the EU, which 
are likely to provide highest quality of expertise, thus promoting scientific legitimacy, however this 
very excellence of the available epistemic base makes all but impossible for the Commission to find 
alternative source of knowledge if it were to make an independent choice.  
With regard to the account developed in the beginning of the paper, in Pfizer the General Court 
demonstrated that judiciary is able to evaluate how evidence was used or misused by political 
authorities. It also showed the ability of courts to hold the authorities up to their own standards for 
argumentation. Finally, if we can generalise the analysis of precautionary principle as a formal method 
for republican governance, it shows that formulas add rigor to decision-making, reduce its 
arbitrariness, make it sensitive to arguments, new evidence and changes of belief. Procedurally, this 
makes hidden assumptions and value judgements explicit, provides for transparency and allows 
quality control, by judges or critical public. The limits of the formula are also made obvious – 
formulas may bring about consistency and thus fairness, but cannot provide The One Right solution, 
the use of independent scientific expertise does not prevent political contestation, it only shifts it into 
different domain. That is why instead of searching for what is unattainable, the authorities and 
reviewing courts should rather gear the decisional framework to integrate competing evidence and 
diverging interests, thus merging scientific and political legitimacy rather than segregating them.  
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It is often suggested that guidances like the Communication and soft law in general structure 
discretion;94 on the suggested account that is to say that they facilitate the argumentative rationality 
and make the decision making reasoned and non-arbitrary. The soft instruments are methods for 
discipline of reason, which ideally would constrain the decision-maker to act non-arbitrarily yet would 
not deny it the necessary flexibility of judgement and would not relieve it from the flexibility for that 
judgement. While the soft instruments themselves would often suffice as a method, I hope to have 
showed how courts can enforce (and reshape!) it.  
Note that although the courts can control the rigour of reasoning of just about any authoritative 
decision, they rarely do. The oft-cited reason is lack of resources, but my guess is that courts 
willingness to take a hard look also depends on the availabilities of alternative reasons and narratives 
in the public sphere.  Such is the argument of Alberto Alemanno who claims that impact assessments, 
which are increasingly used in US and EU, may become important source of reasons in the subsequent 
judicial review.95 Similarly Wyatt suggests that the most important difference that the so called yellow 
card mechanism would make is that national parliaments would place in the public sphere new 
arguments which would facilitate rigorous judicial review.96 The placement of reasons and arguments 
in the public sphere can enable judicial rigour, which in turn would increase the role of the reasons. 
This is a virtuous circle which is needed to implement the republican ideal of non-arbitrary 
governance. 
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